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I
INTRODUCTION

Standard principles of academic freedom forbid most interference with the
right of faculty members to write, teach, or speak within the limits of their
professional discipline in accordance with their own opinions, no matter how
pernicious or erroneous those opinions appear to others to be.' It is widely
assumed that extension of these principles to religious colleges and
universities would advance the cause of scholarly inquiry. This would prevent
religious institutions from maintaining any vestige of creedal orthodoxy
through the hiring, firing, rewarding, or disciplining of faculty. The longstanding position of the American Association of University Professors
("AAUP") and the Association of American Colleges ("AAC") is that religious
schools are entitled to depart from these principles so long as they clearly
announce their intention to do so in advance. However, this position is now
widely regarded as an unprincipled and undesirable exception and may well
be abandoned.
The thesis of this article is that the underlying purposes of academic
freedom would not be advanced by its indiscriminate extension to religious
colleges and universities and that, insofar as state action is involved in
enforcing the norms of academic freedom, such extension would be
unconstitutional. The effect of forcing religious schools to disregard religion
in the hiring, tenuring, and disciplining of faculty would be to destroy the
distinctive character of these intellectual communities. If we assume that
sectarian ideas and approaches to knowledge are worth preserving (if only as
a challenge to predominant secular ideology), it is a mistake to destroy the
very institutions responsible for developing, preserving, and presenting those
ideas.
Academic freedom, as understood in the modern secular university, is
predicated on the view that knowledge is advanced only through the
Copyright © 1990 by Law and Contemporary Problems
* Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School.
The author wishes to express appreciation to Albert Alschuler, Akhil Amar, David Currie, Charles
Fried, Douglas Laycock, William Marshall, Michael Stokes Paulsen, Robert Post, and Oliver S.
Thomas for helpful comments on an earlier draft, and to the James H. Douglas Jr. Fund and the
Kirkland & Ellis Professorship for financial support during the preparation of this article.
I. Of course, disciplinary norms are themselves contested, as current disputes over the
evaluation of feminist, racial minority, and critical legal studies scholarship indicate. For the effect of
professional norms on religion, see notes 34-37 and accompanying text.

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 53: No. 3

unfettered exercise of individual human reason in a posture of analytical
skepticism and criticism. In some religious traditions, however, reason is
understood to require reference to authority, community, and faith, and not
just to individualized and rationalistic processes of thought. If religious ideas
and approaches have anything positive to contribute to the sum of human
knowledge, we should recognize that secular methodology cannot be
universalized. To impose the secular norm of academic freedom on unwilling
religious colleges and universities would increase the homogeneity-and
decrease the vitality-of American intellectual life.
Moreover, imposition of the secular norm of academic freedom would
pose a serious threat to the ability of nonmainstream religions to maintain
their identity and proclaim their vision in secular America. Even if the
accommodation of religious approaches to knowledge were not valuable to
the advancement of knowledge itself, a modification of academic freedom
principles would nonetheless be justified because of its importance to
religious freedom.
Before entering the argument, I wish to offer two qualifications. First, it is
not my position that in all cultures under all circumstances the extension of
secular norms of academic freedom to religious institutions would be unwise.
My position is that it would be unwise in modern America, where religion is
highly pluralistic, academia is overwhelmingly secular, and the number of
institutions of higher learning is sufficiently large to permit genuine diversity.
Where the church is established by the state, the religious world is monolithic,
the number of institutions is small, or the secular world is vulnerable, my
assessment would likely be different. Second, it is not my position that
religious colleges and universities should reject or modify academic freedom
principles. Some religious groups will conclude that secular methodologies
are appropriate to the development of religious knowledge within their
traditions, and some will be sufficiently aligned with majoritarian culture that
they will not feel the need to maintain a separate intellectual identity. My
point is that religious bodies should be free to decide this question for
themselves, on religious or other grounds, free from pressure from organized
academia or the government. 2 It is sufficient for these purposes to show that
a departure from secular academic freedom norms might reasonably be seen
as promoting the advancement of knowledge within some religious traditions.
It is not for the rest of us to attempt to determine which ones they are.

2. During the past year, a number of religiously affiliated colleges and universities changed
their relationships with their respective religious denominations, some in the direction of greater,
and some of lesser, denominational control. For examples of the former, see note 16. For an
example of the latter, see Conversation with the President: "We Will Remain a Texas Baptist Institution," 52
The Baylor Line 8-9, 47 (November 1990) (interview with the President of Baylor University
discussing the university trustees' decision to amend the university charter to gain autonomy from
the Baptist General Convention of Texas and thereby avert what they saw as an impending
"fundamentalist" takeover). Nothing in my argument here should be interpreted as endorsing or
disapproving such developments, in either direction.
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I will proceed in three stages. The first section will review the
authoritative definition of secular academic freedom as espoused by the
AAUP and the AAC and the history of its application to religious institutions.
The second section will present reasons why that understanding of academic
freedom should not be imposed on unwilling religious colleges and
universities. The third section will discuss three issues of particular concern:
academic freedom in seminaries and theological schools, behavioral
restrictions on faculty in religious colleges and universities, and application of
laws against discrimination on the basis of religion.
II
THE EVOLVING STATUS OF SECULAR ACADEMIC FREEDOM

As

APPLIED TO RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS

A.

The Two Faces of Academic Freedom

The term "academic freedom" is used to express two different concepts,
which are sometimes in harmony and sometimes in discord. The term refers
both to the freedom of the individual scholar to teach and research without
interference (except for the requirement of adherence to professional norms,
which is judged by fellow scholars in the discipline) and to the freedom of the
academic institution from outside control. Academic freedom thus has two
faces: one individual, the other institutional. Outside interference with a
scholar's work (as, for example, by legislators during the McCarthy period)
violates both principles: it takes away the scholar's freedom of research or
teaching, and it also takes away the institution's exclusive authority to govern
academic matters within its walls. In such a case, the two aspects of academic
freedom are in harmony. Internal interference with a scholar's work (by
faculty peers, departments, or administration), however, can generate conflict
between the two faces of academic freedom. If the scholar calls upon the
assistance of extramural authorities (as, for example, by filing a lawsuit
challenging a denial of tenure), the institution's own autonomy may be
3
threatened.
For obvious reasons, the AAUP has tended to emphasize individual
academic freedom in its pronouncements. The Supreme Court, however, has
tended to emphasize institutional academic freedom. In its most famous
formulation, first offered by Justice Felix Frankfurter, who as a Harvard
professor had been involved in several important academic freedom
controversies, 4 academic freedom encompasses "the four essential freedoms
of a university-to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach,
3. For discussions of the conflict between the two faces of academic freedom, see David M.
Rabban, Does Academic Freedom Limit Faculty Autonomy?, 66 Tex L Rev 1405 (1988); J. Peter Byrne,
Academic Freedom: A "Special Concern of the First Amendment", 99 Yale L J 251 (1989); Matthew W.
Finkin, On "Institutional" Academic Freedom, 61 Tex L Rev 817 (1983); David M. Rabban, A Functional
Analysis of "Individual" and "Institutional" Academic Freedom Under the First Amendment, 53 L & Contemp
Probs 227 (Summer 1990).
4. See Finkin, 61 Tex L Rev at 846 n 118, 847 n121 (cited in note 3).
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what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to
study."

5

The controversy with regard to religious colleges and universities presents
the conflict between individual and institutional academic freedom at its most
extreme. The question is whether a religious institution should have the
authority to ensure that its faculty (particularly in theological disciplines)
teach and research within the parameters of the religious tradition. In this
context, the scholar may invoke the individual face of academic freedom,
while the college may invoke the institutional face to defend its desire to
determine for itself who may teach, what may be taught, and how it shall be
taught.
For the most part, references to "academic freedom" in this article are to
individual academic freedom, though for reasons that will become apparent I
believe that institutional academic freedom should be the dominant
conception within religious institutions.
B.

The Position of the AAUP

Through the middle of the 19th century, an essentially religious, or
dogmatic, understanding of truth pervaded higher education in America,
especially at such elite institutions as Harvard, Yale, Amherst, and Princeton.
Colleges existed to impart knowledge; the test of knowledge was its
conformity to the revealed truths of scripture, religious traditions, and
authorities; the advancement of knowledge therefore required that the work
of teachers and scholars be tested against the truths of religion. The modern
university was born in a conscious attempt to free scholarly investigation from
the strictures of this single, constrained understanding of the advancement of
knowledge. Academic freedom became the central operating tenet of the
modern secular university. Under this modern view, colleges and universities
exist to advance the frontiers of knowledge; the test of knowledge is its ability
to withstand the rigors of debate and disputation; the advancement of
knowledge requires that the work of teachers and scholars be free from all
constraints other than those of the academic discipline.
It was not long before the modem secular university came to dominate
American higher education, and this secular, noninstitutional understanding
of academic freedom became part of the higher law of American higher
education. This understanding assumed its canonical form in the 1940
Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure, jointly issued by
the AAUP and the AAC. 6 While the 1940 Statement technically has no legal
force in its own right (though its extralegal authority is considerable), it has
been adopted by most accrediting agencies, whose determinations do have
5. Sweezy v New Hampshire, 354 US 234, 263 (1957). The formulation came from a conference
of scholars from the Universities of Cape Town and Witwatersrand.
6. Reprinted in AAUP, Policy Documents and Reports 3 (AAUP, 1990), and in 76 Academe 37
(May-June 1990) (" 1940 Statement"); see Appendix B, 53 L & Contemp Probs 407 (Summer 1990).
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legal effect. 7 For example, the two agencies that are responsible for
accreditation of law schools-the American Bar Association ("ABA") and the
Association of American Law Schools ("AALS")-both use the 1940
8
Statement as their standard for academic freedom.
As set forth in the 1940 Statement, academic freedom has three aspects:
(1) the teachers' "full freedom in research and in the publication of the
results"; (2) their "freedom in the classroom in discussing their subject"; and
(3) their freedom "from institutional censorship and discipline" when they
'speak or write as citizens." These few words have given rise to an elaborate
"common law" of academic freedom through the written opinions of the
AAUP's Committee A on Academic Freedom and Tenure, which investigates
and issues reports on alleged violations. The 1940 Statement contains no
acknowledgement of the institutional dimension of academic freedom.
The 1940 Statement, however, did not require religious institutions to
adopt this particular conception of academic freedom. Recognizing that the
older tradition of the pursuit of knowledge through fealty to religious
authority was still common, the 1940 Statement said that "[1limitations of
academic freedom because of religious or other aims of the institution should
be clearly stated in writing at the time of the appointment." This statement
was ambiguous, presumably deliberately so. It did not explicitly authorize or
condone limitations on academic freedom; but it assumed they would exist
and regulated them through the requirement of open disclosure. In practice,
the limitations clause was taken to mean that religious colleges and
universities were free to adopt their own principles of academic freedom
7. A significant exception is the accreditation standards of the American Association of
Theological Schools ("AATS"), which do not follow the 1940 Statement. See AATS, Bulletin 9, 11,
Pt 3 (1972) (Standards for Accrediting); id at 3-8, Pt 5 (Academic Freedom and Tenure).
8. ABA Standard 405(d) provides: "The law school shall have an established and announced
policy with respect to academic freedom and tenure of which Annex I herein is an example but is not
obligatory." ABA, Standardsfor Approval of Law Schools, § 405(d) (1987). Annex I, in turn, follows the
text of the 1940 Statement, including the limitations clause. Id at Annex I.
Bylaw 6-8(d) of the AALS provides: "A faculty member shall have academic freedom and tenure
in accordance with the principles of the American Association of University Professors." AALS,
Association Handbook 24 (1990) (Bylaws of the Association of American Law Schools, Inc.). It is
noteworthy that this refers to the "principles" of the AAUP and not to the 1940 Statement as such,
apparently indicating that the AALS standards on academic freedom are set by the AAUP and will
change as the AAUP's "principles" change. The Regulations of the AALS Executive Committee
clarify the bylaw as follows:
Those principles are defined by the American Association of University Professors' 1940
Statement on Academic Freedom and Tenure and the Interpretive Comments adopted in
1970. Specifically, the Association of American Law Schools adopts the position of the 1970
Interpretive Comments that: "most church-related institutions no longer need or desire the
departure from the principles of academic freedom implied in the 1940 Statement, and we
do not now endorse such a departure."
Id at 38 (Association of American Law Schools Executive Committee Regulations, Regulation 6.16).
For a discussion of the 1970 Interpretive Comments, see notes 13-16 and accompanying text.
9. AAUP, Policy Documents at 3, 76 Academe at 37, Appendix B at 407 (cited in note 6).
Although the words of the limitation apply to all aspects of academic freedom, the limitations clause
appears only in the paragraph of the 1940 Statement pertaining to academic freedom in the
classroom.
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without interference or censure by the academic community, so long as those
principles were clearly announced in advance.
For example, in a leading case in 1965 involving Gonzaga University, a
Jesuit institution, Committee A opined that "satisfactory conditions of
academic freedom and tenure now prevail at Gonzaga University,"' 0 even
though the university required each faculty member to "be careful not to
introduce into his teaching controversial matter which ...

is contrary to the

specified aims of the institution"I and reserved the right to dismiss
which contradict explicit
nontenured faculty for "inculcation of viewpoints
2
principles of Catholic faith and morals."'
Thus secular and religious universities could coexist, each operating
within its own understanding of the principles needed for the advancement of
knowledge. Many religiously affiliated schools freely adopted the academic
freedom norms of the secular universities. A very small number maintained
the older dogmatic approach within the entire institution, requiring faculty
and sometimes students to abide by religious codes of conduct and faith. A
larger number adopted various compromises with the secular position,
embracing academic freedom in its essentials but taking certain steps to
preserve the religious identity of the school. Many of these institutions
confined religious constraints to those disciplines, such as theology, where
religious norms were most directly relevant. The organized academic
community did not attempt to interfere with these choices under the 1940
Statement, so long as they were clearly stated in writing.
After World War II, the secular vision of knowledge gained in power, and
many religious colleges and universities came to accept the rationalist
methodology that underlies the prevailing modem understanding of
academic freedom. Opposition to any limitation on the scope of secular
academic freedom mounted within academic institutions. The coexistence of
different approaches to academic inquiry came to be seen as anachronistic and
intolerable. In 1970, a committee of the AAUP issued an "Interpretive
Comment" to the 1940 Statement, stating that "[m]ost church-related
institutions no longer need or desire the departure from the principle of
academic freedom implied in the 1940 Statement, and we do not now endorse
such a departure.13
This Interpretive Comment was of uncertain authority. How could a mere
committee alter the terms of a fundamental charter that had been4
unanimously endorsed by 120 educational and disciplinary organizations?'
10. Academic Freedom and Tenure: Gonzaga University, 51 AAUP Bull 8, 17 (Spring 1965).
11. Idat 17.
12. Id at 19. While "commending" the University for its revised statement of policy and making
no objection to the policies quoted in the text, Committee A criticized the procedural aspects of the
Gonzaga policy in some detail. Id at 17-20.
13. AAUP, Policy Documents at 5 (cited in note 6).
14. See The "Limitations" Clause in the 1940 Statement of Principles, 74 Academe 52, 56 (SeptemberOctober 1988). Moreover, it should be noted that the Interpretive Comment was not adopted by the
AAC.
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More importantly, it seemed to link the status of the exception for religious

institutions to the current demands of "most" of such institutions, rather than
to a principled determination of whether any such institutions should have the
5
option to depart from the prevailing understandings of academic freedom.'
Developments since 1970, especially within the Roman Catholic Church and
some evangelical denominations, cast doubt on the empirical basis for this
Interpretive Comment.' 6 It is evident today that a significant (though of
course numerically small) number of church-related institutions do in fact

need or desire to depart from the vision of secular academic freedom
embodied in the 1940 Statement. Accordingly, the AAUP has been forced to
confront the normative question more directly.
In 1988, a subcommittee of the AAUP's Committee A on Academic
Freedom and Tenure issued a report recommending that the limitation in the
1940 Statement be interpreted as disapproving any departure from the
Statement's position on academic freedom. The subcommittee stated that the
"necessary consequence" of the decision by religious institutions to invoke
the exception in the 1940 Statement is that they forfeit "the moral right to
proclaim themselves as authentic seats of higher learning."' 7 According to

the subcommittee, "[a]n institution has no 'right' under the 1940 Statement
simultaneously to invoke the Limitations Clause and to claim that it is an
institution of learning to be classed with institutions that impose no such
restriction." 18
15. See id at 53 (observing that the Interpretive Comment "becomes exceedingly fragile,
subject, as it logically would seem to be, to shifts in the felt needs of the institutions affected by it").
16. PopeJohn Paul II recently announced that "all Catholic teachers are to be faithful to, and all
other teachers are to respect, Catholic doctrine and morals in their research and teachings," and that
all church-run colleges and universities must include as part of their identity "a recognition of and
adherence to the teaching authority of the church in matters of faith and morals." 4 National and
InternationalReligion Report 6-7, 21 (October 8, 1990). New trustees installed by the Southern Baptist
Convention at church-run seminaries have introduced more stringent creedal requirements for
seminary teaching. See id at 6 (describing new requirements at Southern Baptist Seminary in
Louisville, KY). See also Academic Freedom and Tenure: Concordia Theological Seminary (Indiana), 75
Academe 57 (May-June 1989) (describing new requirements at seminary run by the Evangelical
Lutheran Church, Missouri Synod).
17. The "Limitations" Clause, 74 Academe at 55 (cited in note 14).
18. Id. The subcommittee characterized this as a "return to the original basis of the 1940
Statement's limitation clause." Id at 56. This claim is difficult to credit. Under the subcommittee's
interpretation, the "limitation" in the 1940 Statement imposes an obligation on schools that depart
from its academic freedom rules (the obligation to announce the departure in advance), without
giving such schools any benefit or indulgence in return. Besides being inherently implausible (if
institutions that depart from academic freedom as defined in the 1940 Statement are not truly
colleges or universities, how do the AAUP and the AAC gain jurisdiction over them to require that
they publish their policies in advance?), the subcommittee's interpretation is contradicted by the
history of the 1940 Statement. As the subcommittee noted, id at 52, the AAC's chief negotiator of
the 1940 Statement believed that it was in substance the same as the 1925 Conference Statement to
which the AAUP was a party. This Conference Statement read:
A university or college may not impose any limitation upon the teacher's freedom in the
exposition of his own subject in the classroom or in addresses and publications outside the
college, except in so far as the necessity of adopting instruction to the needs of immature
students, or in the case of institutions of a denominational or partisan character, specific
stipulations in advance, fully understood and accepted by both parties, limit the scope and
character of instruction.
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Significantly, the subcommittee refused to countenance any distinction
between secular disciplines and theological disciplines, even including
programs of professional instruction for clergy. "[I]f theology is an academic
discipline," the subcommittee opined, "it must be treated as any other
discipline. Higher education is not catechesis, and this is no less true for
professional clerical education than for any other professional calling."' 19
Moreover, the subcommittee concluded that what it called a "free university"
may not include within itself a component, such as a seminary, that "requires
creedal orthodoxy as a consequence of its singular religious mission." Not
only is such a seminary deprived of its status as an "authentic seat of higher
learning," but the university of which it is a part shares in the opprobrium.
Inclusion of such a component, according to the subcommittee, would be
"wrong" because of its effect on the scholars in the seminary itself, on their
colleagues in other disciplines-whose academic freedom would not be
"secure"-and on the institution as a whole, which would "labor under a
cloud of suspicion that the teachings and writings of its faculty may not be
20
truly free."
After publishing the subcommittee report for comment, the full
Committee A adopted the following, somewhat ambiguous, restatement of its
position:
Committee A considered the report of the subcommittee on "The 'Limitations' Clause
in the 1940 Statement of Principles" and the published and unpublished commentary
on it. The committee declined to accept the subcommittee's invitation to hold that the
invocation of the clause exempts an institution from the universe of higher education,
in part due to the belief that it is not appropriate for the Association to decide what is
and what is not an authentic institution in higher education. The committee did
conclude, however, that invocation of the clause does not relieve an institution
of its
2
obligation to afford academic freedom as called for in the 1940 Statement. '

Unfortunately, not even the members of Committee A know what this
statement means. The chair of the committee has written that he thought that
the restatement "would have put the issue to rest, that in Committee A's
Id, reprinted in 18 AAUP Bull 329 (1932).

The language of the 1925 Conference Statement

obviously created an exception for denominational schools. If the 1940 Statement was in substance the
same, then its limitation should be read in the same way. Moreover, this was the consistent
interpretation by AAUP committees until 1988. See Report of the Special Committee on Academic Freedom
in Church-Related Colleges and Universities, 53 AAUP Bull 369, 370 (Winter 1967) (characterizing the

limitations clause as "accommodat[ing] the church-related institutions"); see also Gonzaga University,
51 AAUP Bull at 27 (cited in note 10). The 1970 "de-endorsement" is further confirmation that the
limitations clause was understood to serve the "need or desire" of the religious institution and not
simply to impose an unrequited burden.
The 1988 subcommittee frankly acknowledged that one "decided advantage" of its strategy of
reinterpreting the limitations clause of the 1940 Statement rather than "de-endorsing" it, as had
been done by the committee in 1970, is that this would avoid the "parliamentary quandary" of how
to amend "a jointly drafted document that is now endorsed by over 120 educational and disciplinary
organizations." The "Limitations" Clause, 74 Academe at 56 (cited in note 14). This appears to be an
open confession of an attempt to avoid the parliamentary processes of the AAUP and the AAC
through creative interpretation. Independent of its merits, so disingenuous a recommendation
should be resoundingly rejected.
19.

The "Limitations" Clause, 74 Academe at 55 (cited in note 14).

20.
21.

Id at 55-56.
Report of Committee A 1988-89, 75 Academe 49, 54 (September-October 1989).
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judgment a church-related institution must afford the same academic freedom
that all other accredited degree-granting institutions must observe." 22 He
went on to note that "[a]t ourJune meeting, however, I was badly disabused
of this simplistic, or perhaps simpleminded notion," finding that a "majority
of the committee now consider the last sentence to be no more than a truism
that begs the question of what obligation a church-related institution has to
afford academic freedom." He concluded that "[t]hat question will
23
apparently continue to vex us."
Undoubtedly that question will continue to vex church-related institutions
as well. They will continue to operate in the dark about what obligations the
AAUP considers them to bear and when to expect a judgment of censure for
their practices. Three of the cases discussed in the same report resulted in
formal censure of church-related institutions, in one case a distinguished
university, for actions designed to ensure that doctrinal instruction in their
seminaries or theology schools was in accordance with the institution's
doctrine. 24 The full reports in those cases suggest that Committee A has
repudiated the limitations clause of the 1940 Statement de facto, even if it
continues to wallow in standardless ambiguity dejure. One would think that
the affected institutions are as entitled to a clear statement of the rules said to
govern their conduct as the AAUP's 1940 Statement insists their faculty must
receive.
III
WHY PROTECT THE INSTITUTIONAL ACADEMIC FREEDOM OF

RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS?

Even while adhering to the limitations clause accommodating religious
colleges and universities, organized academia never articulated any principled
justification for doing so. An AAC report in 1922 characterized limitations on
teachers' freedoms as "concessions to weakness," 2 5 perhaps owing to the fact
that "such a large percentage of institutions were then under denominational

control." 2 6 If the latter is the explanation, this implies that the current move
to eliminate the accommodation is attributable to the fact that affected
institutions are now so badly outnumbered. But the small number of
exceptional
institutions
remaining argues for, not against, their
accommodation. When the vast majority of academic institutions are
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. See id at 49-50 (Southeastern Baptist Theological Seminary (North Carolina)); id at 51-52
(Concordia Theological Seminary (Indiana)); id at 54 (Catholic University of America, Washington,
D.C.). Although mentioned in the 1988-89 Report, the formal resolution of censure against Catholic
University occurred the following year.
25. The 1922 AAC Committee proposed certain "temporary conventions," which were
precursors of the 1940 Statement. See The "Limitations" Clause, 74 Academe at 52 (cited in note 14),
referring to Report of the Association of American Colleges Commission on Academic Freedom and Academic
Tenure, 8 AAUP Bull 543 (1922).
26. The "Limitations" Clause, 74 Academe at 53 (cited in note 14).
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committed to the view of knowledge reflected in the principle of secular
academic freedom, there is little to be gained and much to be lost from
quelling the few dissenting institutional voices. As religious institutions, such
schools are more valuable as exemplars of an alternative understanding of
knowledge than they could ever be as (in many cases, unexceptional) secular
colleges.
As an alternative rationale for the religious accommodation, the 1988
subcommittee mentioned (without repudiating or endorsing) the argument
that "many of these institutions usefully function as 'decompression
chambers' that ease the passage into the larger world for the religiously
provincial." 2 7 The condescension-indeed bigotry-of this suggestion seems
to have passed unnoticed.
The AAUP's experts on academic freedom have confessed themselves
unable to "discern a principled reason" why religious colleges and
universities should not be required to conform to the same standards of
academic freedom appropriate to secular institutions.2 8 I would suggest three
reasons: (1) religiously distinctive colleges and universities make important
contributions to the intellectual life of their faculty, their students, and the
nation, and secular academic freedom in its unmodified form would lead
quickly to the extinction of these institutions; (2) the insistence on a single
model of truth-seeking is inconsistent with the antidogmatic principles on
which the case for academic freedom rests; and (3) even if the extension of
secular academic freedom to religious institutions were desirable on
intellectual grounds, it would subvert the ability of religious communities to
maintain and transmit their beliefs, and thus undermine religious freedom.
A.

The Value of Religious Colleges and Universities

Few observers would doubt that religious scholars and institutions have
made significant contributions to the ethical, cultural, and intellectual life of
our nation. Religious notions of the pursuit of knowledge might well be
intolerable for a modern scientific, pluralistic nation if universally imposed;
but, as adopted voluntarily by a limited number of institutions, they enrich
our intellectual life by contributing to the diversity of thought and preserving
important alternatives to post-Enlightenment secular orthodoxy. Their very
distinctiveness makes them better able to resist the popular currents of
majoritarian culture and thus to preserve the seeds of dissent and alternative
understandings that may later be welcomed by the wider society.
But though few openly challenge the worth of religious colleges and
universities, many are indifferent or even hostile to the practices that may be
necessary for their preservation. 29 Principal among these practices is a
27. Id, citing David Riesman, On Higher Education 172-75 (Jossey-Bass, 1980).
28. Id.
29. In a recent article, for example, a professor of religious studies concluded a call for
extending secular academic freedom to religious institutions with the remarkable assertion that "[aill
closed systems threaten the critical mind and the open society, especially those systems of thought
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vigilance to preserve a distinctive character in the face of the pervasively
secular academic culture. One of the primary tenets of secular academic
freedom is that scholars must be appointed and retained without regard to
their creedal or philosophical commitments, other than to the established
norms of their professional disciplines. At best, the effect of this application
of academic freedom is to randomize every faculty with respect to creed and
philosophy. This increases diversity within each faculty, but it eliminates
diversity among faculties. Every faculty will tend to resemble every other
faculty, subject only to statistical deviations from the mean. Under such a
system, religiously distinctive institutions necessarily will cease to exist. The
faculty manage the institution; if they are hired and retained without regard to
their religious commitments, only a small minority will hold to the tenets of
30
the institution, and the institution will inevitably lose its essential character.
Extension of the secular understanding of academic freedom would
effectively expel religiously distinctive colleges from American intellectual
life, either putting them out of business or, which is much the same thing,
forcing them to adopt the intellectual mores of secular academia. The
desirability of that extension must be judged according to the desirability of
that consequence.
B.

Consistency with the Purposes of Academic Freedom

As a normative principle, academic freedom is justified primarily in terms
of its necessity for the advancement of "learning and scholarship." 3 1 Scholars
are not accorded this extraordinary degree of autonomy as a privilege, but
because we understand the clash of competitive ideas to be the method by
which truth is best discovered. But this idea, too, must be subject to testing
and falsification. It contradicts the premises of academic freedom to state that
one idea-the idea of academic freedom-must be given a privileged status
and imposed universally by coercive means.
The older religious, or dogmatic, tradition also had its theory of
knowledge. It held to certain propositions: (1) truth is unchanging and exists
prior to and independent of the process of discovery; (2) truth is only partially
discernible through human efforts; indeed, the products of human effort,
and life that enjoin religious obligations and enjoy religious legitimations." Lonnie D. Kliever,
Academic Freedom and Church-Affiliated Universities, 66 Tex L Rev 1477, 1480 (1988). If any system of
thought that seeks to enforce norms it considers authoritative is a threat to the critical mind and the
open society, then the free exercise of religion, far from being the hallmark of a free society, is its
nemesis.
30. A similar argument can be made for other distinctive colleges, such as single-sex colleges,
and may well have merit in those contexts as well. But our society is morally and perhaps
constitutionally committed to eradication of differences based on gender (and other distinctions of
an invidious character). It is not committed to eradication of differences based on religion; to the
contrary, it is committed to preservation of pluralism and diversity in matters of religion. Religiously
distinctive institutions thus stand on a different footing.
31. See Byrne, 99 Yale LJ at 275-78 (cited in note 3). "The First Amendment protects the
central intellectual efforts of the modern university. These efforts include teaching, scholarship, and
experimentation, all of which contribute unique cultural and intellectual values to a free society." Id
at 258.
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being a manifestation of a fallen nature, should always be tested against divine
authority; (3) truth is imparted to humanity, at least in part, through divine
agency, whether this is the Holy Bible, the tradition and teaching authority of
the church, or the unaided inner light of conscience; (4) departures from
established understandings are as likely to result in error as in advancement of
truth; and (5) the consequences of the spread of error are serious and eternal.
It is easy to see why an adherent to these propositions would be unwilling to
accept secular academic freedom, which assumes that truth is always in the
process of discovery through human reason, and that error must be tolerated
(perhaps even welcomed) as necessary to the discovery of truth.
It would be a mistake to dismiss the religious understanding as mere
obscurantism. Its presuppositions regarding the pursuit of knowledge differ
substantially from those most of us in modern academia share, but they have
an integrity and a coherence. Whether they are right or wrong is not
susceptible to proof; this is ultimately a proposition of faith. But the same
must be said of the scientific method that underlies academic freedom.
Neither religious nor rationalist methodology can be "proven" from an
objective standpoint. Both systems of thought claim to be self-validating, in
that practitioners of both believe that their results are so compelling that one
32
who engages in them will be compelled to assent to their validity.

For a limited number of institutions to adhere to the older norm is
therefore not antithetical to but rather consistent with the purposes behind
the institution of academic freedom. It will increase diversity in the culture as
a whole and enable the competition of ideas to continue. As Douglas Laycock
and Susan Waelbroeck observed in a recent article, "from a societal
perspective, pluralism and the search for truth may be more helped than
hindered by distinctive institutions forcefully representing each of the
country's many religious traditions." 33 It is important that a principle born of
opposition to dogmatism not itself become dogmatic and authoritarian.
Moreover, extension of secular principles of academic freedom could be
particularly self-defeating under current circumstances in academia. As noted
above, the freedom of the individual scholar under standard principles of
academic freedom is limited by the professional norms of the scholar's
discipline. A Ptolemaist in an astronomy department would not last long.
Recent disputes over the evaluation of the work of scholars writing from the
perspectives of racial minorities or of feminism have highlighted the
32.

A Catholic philosopher put the point in this way:
The truth of faith makes an incontrovertible demand upon the intellect of the believer, a
demand no more open to denial than that made by facts of experience or evident logical
truths. The unbeliever is unaware of this demand, not because of any greater freedom on
his part, but rather because of incapacity-as the blind man is unaware of the demand that
visible evidence makes upon the minds of those who can see.
Germain Gabriel Grisez, Academic Freedom and Catholic Faith, NCEA Bull 15, 17 (November 1967).
33. Douglas Laycock & Susan E. Waelbroeck, Academic Freedom and the Free Exercise of Religion, 66
Tex L Rev 1455, 1458 (1988).
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subjectivity of these professional norms, which many now see as mere screens
34
for the dominant ideology.
Whatever the merits of the argument in those contexts, it can scarcely be

doubted that religious perspectives are systematically suppressed and silenced
in the modern academy under the banner of "objective" professional or
disciplinary norms. There are courses in Feminist Jurisprudence at most
major secular law schools; I am not aware of any such course in Christian (or
other religious) Jurisprudence. 35 Would such a course be approved? If
approved by the authorities, how would it be greeted by the students? If

offered, would the professor feel free to "proselytize" for his or her position,
in the way the professor of a course in Feminist Jurisprudence would feel free

to "proselytize"? I suspect that any hint of a religious approach to the subject
matter would be deemed academically inappropriate. 36 Is there any major

intellectual or ideological perspective so "invisible" in the modern academy
as the religious?

Given the antireligious 37 character of modern academic

culture, serious religious scholarship would be in danger of extinction if it
were not for particular institutions in which it is valued and protected. It is no
coincidence that the rise in religious particularism has occurred most
prominently in institutions connected with perspectives (evangelical and
fundamentalist Protestantism, conservative Catholicism) that consider
themselves most ruthlessly suppressed in the secular academy.
C.

Religiously Distinctive Institutions of Higher Education Are Necessary

for Religious Freedom
Even if the survival of religiously distinctive colleges and universities could
not be defended on academic grounds, our society's commitment to freedom

of religion would demand some accommodation of the need of religious
colleges and universities to modify the secular principles of academic
34. See, for example, Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights
Literature, 132 U Pa L Rev 561 (1984); Lucinda M. Finley, Breaking Women's Silence in Law: The Dilemma
of the Gendered Nature of Legal Reasoning, 64 Notre Dame L Rev 886 (1989). Consider also the dispute
over whether critical legal studies should be considered a legitimate mode of discourse in academic
law. See Paul D. Carrington, "Of Law and the River, " 34 J Legal Educ 222 (1984); Symposium, "Of
Law and the River, "and of Nihilism and Academic Freedom, 35J Legal Educ 1 (1985); see also Judith Jarvis
Thomson, Ideology and Faculty Selection, 53 L & Contemp Probs 155 (Summer 1990).
35. That theology speaks usefully to jurisprudence can be seen through such works as Peter
Kaufman, Redeeming Politics (Princeton Univ Press, 1990); Arthur J. Jacobson, The Idolatry of Rules:
Writing Law According to Moses, With Reference to Other Jurisprudences, 11 Cardozo L Rev 1079 (ulyAugust 1990); Elizabeth Mensch & Alan Freeman, The Politics of Virtue: Animals, Theology, and Abortion,
25 Ga L Rev (forthcoming in 199 1)-to mention just three recent works on different subjects from
disparate theological perspectives.
36. A tenured professor at the University of Alabama, for example, was recently instructed to
refrain from making occasional references in the classroom to his religious views, clearly labelled as
personal opinion, or from offering an optional after-class session on the Christian implications of the
subject matter. The University explicitly permits the expression of personal opinions and the
holdings of after-class meetings with students if discussions are not from a religious perspective.
Challenged on free speech, free exercise, and academic freedom grounds, this directive was upheld
by the Eleventh Circuit. Bishop v Aronov, No 90-7239, 1991 WL 23706 (March 15, 1991).
37. By "antireligious," I do not mean that most modern academics oppose the private practice
of religion. What they oppose is the application of religious thought to "real" subjects.
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freedom. These institutions are an important means by which religious faiths
can preserve and transmit their teachings from one generation to the next,
particularly for nonmainstream religions whose differences from the
predominant academic culture are so substantial that they risk annihilation if
they cannot retain a degree of separation. The right to develop and pass on
religious teachings is at the very heart of the first amendment, and there
should be no doubt that these concerns override whatever exiguous benefit to
society might be achieved by forcing religiously distinctive institutions to
8
conform to secular academic freedom.3
Constitutional principles serve as a legal limit only on actors who exercise
governmental power, such as accrediting agencies, 3 9 regulatory bodies, and
courts. Others have made the case that the first amendment protects religious
institutions, especially their theology schools and seminaries, from regulation
designed to enforce secular academic freedom, and I will not repeat their
arguments. 40 One point must be addressed, however: the impact of
Employment Division v. Smith, 4 1 the recent decision that held that the free
exercise clause does not require exemptions from neutral laws of general
applicability. 4 2 Upon cursory examination, the Court's opinion might be
thought to allow enforcement of uniform academic freedom principles against
religious institutions. However, the Smith opinion recognized a number of
exceptions to its rule of facial neutrality, three of which are relevant to this
context: (1) "hybrid" claims, in which free exercise is combined with other
constitutional claims, including the freedoms of speech and association, (2)
the right of parents to control the education of their children, and (3) the
right of religious institutions to control their internal governance in cases
such as property disputes. 43 Any or all of these exceptions should apply here,
and should prevent state actors from interfering with the ability of religious
institutions to require doctrinal fidelity of their faculties.
Beyond the legal limits of the Constitution, however, private actors such as
the AAUP should uphold the free exercise rights of religious institutions and
38. If religion is viewed primarily as an ideological commitment, it would follow that other
ideological positions are similarly entitled to establish colleges and universities with specific creedal
limitations. But religions are more than an ideological commitment. They are also communities of
believers with mutual ties of loyalty and common purpose. Religious colleges and universities do
more than transmit creeds; they also raise up leaders and members in the tradition and communion
of the faith. As such, the function of religious institutions may resemble that of traditional black
colleges more closely than that of an ideological academy. This additional function of religious
institutions probably accounts for the fact that religiously distinctive colleges and universities have
met with a degree of acceptance that would not have been accorded to ideological institutions.
39. Accrediting agencies are generally private organizations, but for these purposes they wield
state power. For example, in most states only a graduate of an accredited law school can stand for
the bar examination, and thus obtain a license to practice law.
40. See Laycock & Waeibroeck, 66 Tex L Rev 1455 (cited in note 33); April Kestell Cassou &
Robert F. Curran, Secular Orthodoxy and Sacred Freedoms: Accreditation of Church-Related Law Schools, II J
Coil & Univ L 293 (1984).
41. Employment Div., Dept of Human Res. of Oregon v Smith, 110 S Ct 1595 (1990).
42. For a critique of the case, see Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith
Decision, 57 U Chi L Rev 1109 (1990).
43. 110 S Ct at 1601-02.
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need not be limited to the narrow conception of these rights expressed in
Smith. The AAUP purports to speak in the name of the academy, and not as a
mere partisan for a particular faction or point of view. Its pronouncements
regarding academic freedom carry weight among academics and the public in
large part because it is seen as objective. Such an association has a moral
responsibility to respect the rights of religious bodies, even if those bodies
entertain an understanding of knowledge contrary to that of the majority of
the AAUP.
Even so, the pronouncements of the AAUP would be of no concern if they
confined themselves to assuring that prospective faculty appointees and
possibly others are not misled into assuming that a religious school complies
with the usual secular norms of academic freedom-what might be called a
"truth in advertising" function. In 1939, on the eve of promulgation of the
1940 Statement, Committee A reported:
[T]his Association would not deny to a group which desires to do so the right to

support an institution for propagating its views. It merely insists that such an
institution ought not to be represented to the public as a college or university for the
promotion of the liberal arts and sciences,4 4in which scholars and teachers are free to
seek and impart truth in all of its aspects.

If truth in advertising were the purpose of Committee A's activities, there
would be no reason to object to its standards. Religious colleges and
universities should not be shy to admit that their understanding of academic
freedom differs from that of the AAUP, and a clear declaration to that effect
should serve to prevent misunderstanding. Margarine is not the same thing
as butter, and margarine producers can have no legitimate objection to a
requirement that they designate their product as such.
The actions and statements of Committee A demonstrate, however, that its
purpose goes far beyond mere truth in advertising. When issuing a report,
the committee does not state that "Institution X abides by standards of
academic freedom different from those required of secular institutions."
Rather, it "censures" the institution for violating academic freedom. The
1988 subcommittee proposal would purport to drum offending institutions
out of the universe of "authentic seat[s] of higher learning"-a position the
full committee recognized as presumptuous, but which continues to animate
its decisions. 45 There can be no doubt that the purpose of the enterprise is to
44. Report of Committee A for 1939, 26 AAUP Bull 45 (1940) (excerpted in The "Limitations" Clause,
74 Academe at 54 (cited in note 14)). Note the unfair twist on the word "truth" in this statement. A
religious college does believe that its "teachers are free to seek and impart truth in all its aspects."
What they object to is the teaching of error. To ask a religious institution to advertise itself in this
way is to ask it to affirm that what it deems error is inffact "truth." It would be more in keeping with
the methodological assumptions of secular academic freedom to affirm that "teachers are free to seek
and impart what they consider to be truth in all of its aspects."
45. For example, Committee A stated that it "questions" whether "[Concordia Theological
Seminary] can be said to function as truly an institution of higher learning." Concordia Theological
Seminary, 75 Academe at 65 (cited in note 16). It is difficult to reconcile this with Committee A's
statement in the 1988-89 Report "that it is not appropriate for the Association to decide what is and
what is not an authentic institution in higher education." Committee A Report, 75 Academe at 54 (cited
in note 21).
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pressure the offending institutions to conform to the AAUP's position or, in

the alternative, to ostracize them. Margarine must not only be clearly
labelled; it must also be driven from the market. This is inconsistent with a
commitment to religious freedom, which the AAUP ought to value even
though it is not legally obliged to do so.
IV
SPECIFIC APPLICATIONS TO THEOLOGY SCHOOLS, MORALS
REGULATION, AND DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF
RELIGION

While the rights of religious colleges and universities should not be
limited to these contexts, a large majority of academic freedom disputes arise
in connection with doctrinal limitations on faculty teaching in theological
disciplines, behavioral restrictions in conformity with the moral tenets of the
religious tradition, and enforcement of antidiscrimination laws.
A.

Theology Schools

Application of secular norms of academic freedom to seminaries and
schools of theology is particularly inappropriate. Yet this has long been the
goal of a segment within organized academia. The AAUP's influential 1915
Declaration of Principles stated:
Finally, in the spiritual life, and in the interpretation of the general meaning and ends
of human existence and its relation to the universe, we are still far from a
comprehension of the final truths, and from a universal agreement among all sincere
and earnest men. In all of these domains of knowledge, the first condition of progress
is complete and unlimited freedom to pursue inquiry and publish its results. Such
freedom is the breath in the nostrils of all scientific activity.

Anyone with a passing familiarity with religious history will recognize the
narrowness and sectarianism of this declaration. It is a statement that virtually
no orthodox Christian of any denomination could accept. 4 7 Its very choice of
words suggests a hostility toward revealed religion. The assertion that
"[s]uch freedom is the breath in the nostrils of all scientific activity" takes its
image from Genesis 2:7, which states that God "breathed into [Adam's] nostrils
the breath of life." The 1915 Declaration thus suggests metaphorically that,
in the modern academy, academic freedom has taken the place formerly
46. AAUP, General Declarationof Principles, reprinted in Richard Hofstadter & Wilson Smith eds,
American Higher Education: A Documentary History 860, 867 (U Chicago Press, 1961); see Appendix A,
53 L & Contemp Probs 393, 398 (Summer 1990).
47. Even those Christian theologians who place a high value on academic freedom would surely
insist that the "first condition of progress" is an openness to the leading of the Holy Spirit. The
noted Protestant theologian Karl Barth, for example, insisted that "reason, if left entirely without
grace, is incurably sick and incapable of any serious theological activity" and can produce statements
of truth "[o]nly when it has been illumined, or at least provisionally shone upon by faith." Peter
Fraenkel, trans, Natural Theology: Comprising "Nature and Grace" by Professor Dr. Emil Brunner and the
Reply "No!" by Dr. Karl Barth (1946), quoted in Mensch & Freeman, 25 Ga L Rev (forthcoming 1991)
(cited in note 35). This, according to Barth, is one of the points Catholicism and Protestantism have
in common.
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occupied by God. For the dominant forces of secular academia to attempt to
impose dogmas of this sort even in the spiritual realm was an ironic reversal of
roles; only a few generations earlier, the dominant forces of religious
academia had successfully imposed the opposite dogmas on the sciences.
The assumption that theology should be conducted according to the
epistemological principles of science is ill-considered. Unlike the scientific
disciplines, in which individual inquiry is the chosen path to discovery and
truth is understood to be independent of the ideas and beliefs of others, the
theological disciplines are communitarian by their very nature. Catholic
theology is not the same as Islamic theology. An atheist, however brilliant, is
likely to be a deficient theologian and poor mentor for aspiring clergy. The
theologian is engaged in working out the ramifications of common beliefs that
unite large numbers of people, and the present with the past. The
advancement of knowledge within a theological tradition occurs principally
through thought and discussion based on shared principles. 48 While
comparative religion (like comparative law) is a valuable supplementary
perspective, it makes no more sense for the Catholic theologian to be allowed
to expound non-Catholic doctrine in the name of the Church than it would for
an American torts professor to teach Chinese tort law as if it were American
law.
Doctrinal limitations are therefore necessary to the theological disciplines
in a way that they are not for the scientific disciplines. 49 It is nothing short of
destructive for the organized forces of academia to attempt to coerce
seminaries and schools of theology into ceasing to enforce their doctrinal
boundaries or adopting the scientific method for the pursuit of spiritual
understanding.
In recent years, Committee A has articulated greater awareness of the
inherent conflict between the purposes of theological education and the
methods of academic freedom. In a recent report, the committee quoted a
statement on academic freedom by the Association of Theological Schools
("ATS") that theological schools may require "confessional adherence" but at
the same time must "practice the highest ideals of academic freedom." The
48. Even in secular disciplines, it is questionable that the pursuit of knowledge is best advanced
through randomizing faculties as to point of view. It is no secret that some departments have a
disproportionate concentration of faculty from a particular school of thought within the discipline.
This presumably is evidence of a departure, conscious or unconscious, from the pure theory of
academic freedom; but it is probably a good thing, at least when different institutions "specialize" in
different schools of thought, thus preserving an overall diversity within academia. This specialization
enables scholars with similar presuppositions to advance the boundaries of knowledge within their
school of thought rather than to divert their energies into disputations over issues so fundamental
that they are unlikely to result in a change of position.
49. Father Charles Curran, who was dismissed from his position as a professor of Catholic
theology at Catholic University, is one of the foremost proponents of increasing the degree of
individual academic freedom in theology schools. Yet even he concedes that "a Catholic theologian
[must] theologize within the sources and parameters of the Catholic faith" and that a Catholic
theologian "who does not believe in Jesus or does not accept a role for the pope in the Church"
could be dismissed for incompetence. Charles E. Curran, Academic Freedom and Catholic Universities, 66
Tex L Rev 1441, 1453-54 (1988).
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committee observed that "one may question whether an institution can do
both at the same time." 50 Notwithstanding this recognition of the
contradiction, the committee continues to engage in the intrusive process of
attempting, as secular outsiders, to determine what degree of doctrinal fidelity
is necessary within the seminary or theological faculty-in the committee's
words, "how far an institution may go in announcing and implementing
limitations on academic freedom without effectively negating any meaningful
51
presence of academic freedom at that institution."
Thus, the attempted resolution of the contradiction seems to be to steer a
middle course: to allow theological schools to maintain some degree of
creedal orthodoxy, but to require them to permit a considerable degree of
freedom within those constraints. As stated by the ATS, "[s]o long as the
teacher remains within the accepted constitutional and confessional basis of
his school, he should be free to teach, carry on research, and to publish,
subject to his adequate performance of his academic duties as agreed upon
52
with the school."
While this may well be an appropriate statement of academic freedom
within a religious institution for intramural purposes, there are two serious
problems with any attempt by secular outsiders to enforce it. First, the degree
of doctrinal freedom consistent with religious orthodoxy varies markedly from
one religious tradition to another and is often a matter of internal
controversy. The determination of how much latitude should exist cannot be
made on a doctrinally neutral basis. Rigid adherence to particular beliefs is
the defining characteristic of some religious traditions, while theological
flexibility and latitudinarianism are the hallmarks of others. To insist on the
maximum degree of academic freedom possible within the tradition is to press
systematically in the direction of latitudinarianism.
For example, in the past decade the Southern Baptist Convention has been
convulsed by an intense doctrinal battle between the so-called
"fundamentalists" and the so-called "moderates." One of the key defining
issues in the controversy is the degree of doctrinal flexibility permitted in the
reading of the Holy Bible, and among the key positions of influence within the
denomination are its seminaries. When the AAUP investigated alleged
academic freedom violations at fundamentalist-controlled Southeastern
Baptist Theological Seminary in Wake Forest, North Carolina, it was put in
the position of adjudicating the merits of these doctrinal positions-though
the committee apparently did not recognize this. Is a strict view of Biblical
inerrancy necessary in order to remain "within the accepted constitutional
and confessional basis" of the Baptist faith? Or is a more "moderate"
hermeneutic theologically acceptable? The permissible degree of departure
from secular academic freedom depends upon the answer to these questions.
While the report of the committee censuring the Southeastern Baptist
50.
51.
52.

Concordia Theological Seminary, 75 Academe at 64 (cited in note 16).
Idat63.
Id at 64.
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Seminary for its "academic freedom violations" may have been a victory for
those who share the "moderate viewpoint" in the doctrinal battle, why should
anyone believe that a committee of the AAUP is competent to decide such
questions? In such a case, the interpretation of academic freedom is not, and
cannot be, anything other than a doctrinal and ecclesiological judgment.
Second, even if the standard were not itself loaded in favor of more
latitudinarian doctrinal positions, investigations by secular outsiders are
likely, consciously or unconsciously, to result in doctrinal judgments. One
assumes that Committee A investigations are the fairest and most
scrupulously neutral one could reasonably hope for, but their reports on
alleged academic freedom violations in religious settings are highly insensitive
to the need for outsiders to refrain from taking sides in intradenominational
religious disputes 53 or from second-guessing the judgments of religious
54
authorities regarding religious matters.

In an analogous context, the Supreme Court insists that civil courts must
not apply their own criteria to the resolution of intrachurch property disputes,
even when the defeated faction was treated unfairly, because of the danger
that such decisions would touch upon disputed doctrinal issues. Instead, the

courts must apply neutral principles of property law to the formal legal
documents of the church, or defer to the church authorities. 55 The AAUP

would be wise to adopt a similar policy. Its attempt to strike a middle ground
between complete imposition of secular academic freedom and complete
recognition of institutional autonomy embroils the organization in doctrinal
disputes in which it has no competence. At least in the context of seminaries
and theological schools, the AAUP should formally abandon any attempt to
second-guess the regulation of doctrinal purity and academic freedom.
53. For example, Committee A's report on Southeastern Baptist Theological Seminary (North
Carolina) reported the "sense of grievance and persecution" felt by "[situdents" at the school (not
some students, but "students"), and equated "student" opinion with the views of "the moderate
Southern Baptist Alliance." Academic Freedom and Tenure: Southeastern Baptist Theological Seminary (North
Carolina), 75 Academe 35, 44 (May-June 1989). Yet the report mentions the existence of another
student organization evidently aligned with the administration, only to criticize members of this
organization for their alleged "rude and sententious questioning and confrontation in classes." Id.
Why does one faction receive the mantle of speaking for "students"? Is it because one is more
numerous? Is it because one is more polite? Is it because one takes a position in the dispute that
AAUP committee members find more congenial?
54. For example, after its investigation of the Catholic University of Puerto Rico, Committee A
reported that the university's statutes had been revised in 1981 "to reflect the views of the
Conference of Bishops of Puerto Rico on the norms of morality that should guide the conduct of
Catholics," including civil divorce and remarriage, but that the new interpretation would not be
applied retroactively to canonically invalid marriages performed before the statement. Academic
Freedom and Tenure: The Catholic University of Puerto Rico, 73 Academe 33, 36 (May-June 1987). The
AAUP committee commented: "Prearranged sin, it seems, is preferable to impulsive iniquity." Id.
The AAUP committee may have jurisdiction to opine that a university's disciplinary regulations are
unjustified, but it has no competence to evaluate the validity of Catholic moral teachings. That it
would make sarcastic remarks about them says much about the nature of the process.
55. See Jones v Wolf, 443 US 595, 603 (1979); Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v Milivojevich, 426 US
696 (1976); Presbyterian Church v Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Presbyterian Church, 393 US 440 (1969); Kedroff
v St Nicholas Cathedral, 344 US 94 (1953).
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Behavioral Regulation

Some religious colleges and universities require their faiculty and students
to adhere to certain standards of conduct, such as not drinking or smoking, or
not (for some Catholic institutions) remarrying following a divorce. 56 The
theory behind these regulations is that the institution is attempting to
communicate a particular way of life to its students and that violation by the
faculty of those precepts would undermine the moral teaching. Behavioral
regulation can be no less important than doctrinal standards to a religious
institution, for actions often speak louder than words.
A particularly egregious example of interference with the rightful
authority of a religious institution occurred recently in the Louisiana state
courts. In Babcock v. New Orleans Baptist Theological Seminary,57 the court
ordered a seminary to grant a Master of Divinity degree in marriage and
family counseling to a student despite a determination by the institution that
he was "unfit for spiritual, moral, mental, or other reasons" stemming from
alleged physical abuse of his wife. 58 The court held that the student's conduct
did not "touch upon theological or ecclesiastical matters" and that the
seminary, an arm of the Southern Baptist Convention, does not "have any
power to determine a student's fitness for ministry." 59 Such a judgment
mocks the first amendment's insistence that civil authorities not meddle with
religious decisions and leave determinations regarding the spiritual
qualifications of clergy to the religious bodies themselves.
Moreover, the countervailing concerns for academic freedom are far less
powerful in cases of behavioral regulation than in cases involving creedal
limitations. Restrictions on behavior are not restrictions on thought; indeed,
the connection to academic freedom is rather attenuated. To tell a professor
he may not smoke does not limit the professor's freedom to teach, research,
or write in accordance with his scholarly judgment. 60 Presumably, the only
reasons moral regulation is deemed to raise an academic freedom problem
are that it has an indirect effect on the pool of faculty (to restrict the faculty to
nondrinkers, for example, might tend to produce a faculty with certain
attitudes of mind) and that it creates opportunities for hiding improper
disciplinary actions. Tenure systems are easier to police if the grounds for
dismissal are few and extreme. These reasons may be sufficient to treat moral
regulation as an academic freedom problem in the usual case, but they are not
sufficient to overcome the institution's interest in communicating through
deed as well as word. The AAUP should formally declare that it will no longer
interfere with behavioral regulation within religious institutions, where the
56. See, for example, Catholic University of Puerto Rico, 73 Academe 33 (cited in note 54). The
case involved the dismissal of a Catholic faculty member for a canonically invalid marriage.
57. 554 S2d 90 (La App 1989), cert denied, 111 S Ct 214 (1990) (Justice Blackmun dissented
from the Court's denial of certiorari).
58. 554 S2d at 96.
59. Id at 97.
60. Sanford H. Kadish, Church-Related Law Schools: Academic Values and Deference to Religion, 32 J
Legal Educ 161, 169 (1982).
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regulation leaves the faculty freedom to teach, research, and publish without
interference.
C.

Antidiscrimination Claims

Sometimes the objection to creedal limitations on faculty or students is
described in terms of discrimination rather than academic freedom. The
problem, it is said, is that faculty or students are being discriminated against
61
based on their religion.
In the context of federal employment discrimination laws, Congress
passed legislation exempting religious institutions from any prohibition on
discriminating in favor of members of their own denomination, 6 2 and the
Supreme Court unanimously upheld the law. 63 Justice Brennan explained
that religious organizations must be "able to condition employment in certain
activities on subscription to particular religious tenets" because "we deem it
vital that, if certain activities constitute part of a religious community's
practice, then a religious organization should be able to require that only
members of its community perform those activities." 64
A similar principle should be applied to claims of discrimination in
admissions or other academic decision-making. If the need for religious
discrimination is legitimate in the case of janitors in a church-owned
gymnasium, as the Court held, it is even more legitimate in the case of those
appointed to teach in institutions responsible for education within the
tradition of the faith. For the same reasons that secular academic freedom
norms should be accommodated to the needs of religious institutions,
accommodations should be made to the prohibition of discrimination on the
basis of religion.
V
CONCLUSION

Academic freedom is central to the conception and function of a secular
university, where the clash of ideas and the process of unfettered investigation
lie at the heart of teaching and research. But that does not mean that the
same norms of academic freedom must or should be applied indiscriminately
to institutions with a different conception and function. Secular academic
freedom could be as destructive of religious education, in some traditions at
least, as the earlier dogmatic approach to knowledge would be of secular
61. Discrimination on the basis of gender (or, much more rarely, race) can also give rise to free
exercise problems in religious institutions. These problems are not related to academic freedom and
are beyond the scope of this article. For analyses of the problem, see Bruce N. Bagni, Discriminationin
the Name of the Lord: A Critical Evaluation of Discrimination by Religious Organizations, 79 Colum L Rev
1514 (1979); Douglas Laycock, Tax Exemptions for Racially Discriminatory Schools, 60 Tex L Rev 259
(1982); Ira C. Lupu, Free Exercise Exemption and Religious Institutions: The Case of Employment
Discrimination,67 BU L Rev 391 (1987).
62. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 USC § 2000e-I (1988).
63. Corporation of Presiding Bishop v Amos, 483 US 327 (1987).
64. Id at 342-43 (concurring opinion).
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research universities. Most observers readily concede the value of religiously
distinctive institutions, especially in the theological disciplines, within a
pluralistic system of American higher education. But many, including the
dominant forces within organized academia, are unwilling to accept that the
preservation of these distinctive institutions requires some accommodation of
the principle of secular academic freedom, and that the degree of
accommodation depends crucially on the doctrinal position of the individual
institution. The result has been a series of unhappy incursions into the
religious field that have left both defenders of religious autonomy and
advocates of secular academic freedom dissatisfied with the determinations.
It would be far better for the secular academic world to return to the letter
of the 1940 Statement, which allowed religious institutions to determine for
themselves what "limitations" on secular academic freedom are necessary to
maintain their own sense of mission, subject only to the requirement that
these be stated clearly in advance. 6 5 If it did so, secular and religious higher
education would again be able to coexist in fruitful exchange, without
intrusion or interference.

65. Even the requirement of advance notice should not be interpreted to preclude a religious
institution from making good faith changes in its internal rules of religious governance, but only to
require the institution to reveal its rules to faculty and prospective faculty. Religious freedom
includes the right to change belief as well as to stick by it. As long ago as 1929, the Supreme Court
held that it would be unconstitutional for civil authorities to interfere in the decisions of church
tribunals on ecclesiastical affairs, even when changes in doctrine affected private rights. Gonzalez v
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 280 US 1 (1929).

